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Abstract
Since 2013, Australian aid has been reduced
and increasingly focused on delivering benefits
to Australia. Motivated by these changes, this
paper fills three gaps in the existing literature
onpublic opinion about aid. It provides the only
recent detailed study of Australians’ opinions
about aid. It studies specific policy questions
in addition to the broader questions typical of
international research. And it studies views on
the purpose of aid, an area not previously
researched. AlthoughAustralians are generally
supportive of aid,most backedmajor aid cuts in
2015. However, most Australians think the pur-
pose of Australian aid should be helping people
in poor countries, not bringing benefits to
Australia. There is a clear left–right divide in
responses to all questions; however, some vari-
ables correlated with support for aid fail to
explain variation in views about aid’s purpose.
The paper concludes by discussing ramifica-
tions for those who seek to change aid policy.
Key words: aid, public opinion, Australia,
aid policy
1. Introduction
The election of the centre-right Coalition gov-
ernment in 2013 brought major changes to
Australian aid. The government aid budget
was repeatedly cut culminating with the largest
ever cuts to Australian aid at the beginning of
the 2015–16 financial year (Howes & Pryke
2014). The Coalition government has also
placed an increased emphasis on giving aid to
advance Australia’s own interests rather than
helping developing countries (Wood et al.
2017, p. 244).
Although public opinion is not the only fac-
tor that shapes high-level aid policy decisions,
there is international evidence that suggests
that the views of the public play a contributing
role in the choices politicians make about aid
policy (Chong & Gradstein 2008; Heinrich
et al. 2016; Milner & Tingley 2010; Milner &
Tingley 2011; Prather 2011; Stern 1998). In
Australia, politicians have repeatedly
emphasised the need for public support if the
aid budget is to be grown again (for example,
Bishop 2017; Fierravanti-Wells 2017).
Policymakers, academics and those seeking
to influence aid policy in Australia currently
have two different types of information that
they can draw upon as they seek to better
understand Australians’ views on aid. The first
of these is Australian polling conducted by
organisations such as the Lowy Institute (e.g.
Oliver 2017, p. 16). The second is international
academic work on aid and public opinion
(e.g. Chong & Gradstein 2008; Diven &
Constantelos 2009; Henson & Lindstrom
2013; Paxton & Knack 2012).1 However, both
of these different types of information have
limitations for someone seeking a
1. Two Australian studies have conducted more sophisti-
cated analyses of survey data about opinions on aid; how-
ever, one study (Kelley 1989) is nearly 20 years old and
the unit of analysis in the other paper (Wood et al. 2016)
is electoral districts, not individual Australians.
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comprehensive understanding of public views
about aid policy in Australia. A key limitation
of polls such as those run by the Lowy Institute
is that they provide only basic aggregate infor-
mation on levels of support. Although this is
sometimes accompanied by simple cross tabu-
lations looking at bivariate relationships be-
tween particular respondent traits and views
about aid, no serious attempt is undertaken to
control for confounding variables when identi-
fying traits associated with different views
about aid. As a result, because of the risk of
spurious relationships, these types of polls re-
veal little about the traits most likely to drive
different views about aid in Australia.
Many international studies, on the other
hand, do carefully control for the influence of
different variables and do identify important
traits associated with different views about
aid. However, these studies have their own par-
ticular limitation for the Australian audience:
none focus on Australia. This is an issue both
because support for aid varies considerably be-
tween countries, and because the relationships
between different traits and views about aid
also vary (Clarke et al. 2014; Paxton & Knack
2012). Much of the international work also
draws on data from very general questions, at
least one degree removed from the actual pol-
icy decisions public opinion is thought to shape
(Hudson & vanHeerde-Hudson 2012). Typi-
cally, survey participants are not told how
much aid their country gives nor are policy op-
tions and trade-offs made clear as survey
participants’ views are sought (Hudson &
vanHeerde-Hudson 2012). Instead, the staple
of the international literature are questions such
as the following (used by Chong & Gradstein
2008; Clarke et al. 2014; Diven &
Constantelos 2009; Paxton & Knack 2012):
Some people favour, and others are against,
having this country provide economic aid to
poorer countries. Do you think that this country
should provide more or less economic aid to
poorer countries?
Another limitation both of polls such as the
Lowy Poll and international scholarly work is
that, almost without exception, these undertak-
ings focus either on support for aid or views
about aid volume and do not analyse data from
questions that focus on people’s preferences
about the purpose of aid giving. However, in
Australia, the increasing focus on using
Australian aid to bring benefits to Australia
has become a major policy issue (Wood et al.
2017, p. 244). Australia is not alone in this;
international work has shown mixed motives
with respect to the purpose of aid to be a fraught
area for many donors (Alesina & Dollar 2000;
Heinrich 2013; Hoeffler & Outram 2011).
In this paper, I draw on data from two public
opinion surveys to provide a detailed picture of
the Australian public’s views on aid. As I do
this, I address the issues that I have just
outlined. I use Australian data. I study broad
support for aid, and I study responses to a more
specific policy-relevant question about the
2015 aid cuts. I also study responses to a ques-
tion about the purpose of aid. In addition to pro-
viding findings based on aggregate responses
to these questions, I use regression analysis to
identify the socio-demographic traits and be-
liefs associated with support for aid, opposition
to aid cuts, and preferred purpose of aid giving.
Looking at aggregate results, I find strong
public support for Australia giving aid, but I
also find that this support did not translate into
opposition to the 2015 aid cuts—most
Australians favoured the cuts over policy alter-
natives. I also find that a substantial majority of
Australians want aid given for the purpose of
helping developing countries rather than for
the sake of advancing Australia’s geostrategic
and commercial interests. My regression re-
sults are similar, but not identical, when com-
paring general support for aid and opposition
to aid cuts. Most clearly, academic education
and left-leaning political views are associated
with both support for aid and opposition to
cuts, while age is associated with opposition
to aid and support for cuts. There are clear dif-
ferences, however, in some of the traits associ-
ated with support for aid and those associated
with the belief that the purpose of Australian
aid giving should be humanitarian, and not
about bringing benefits to Australia. For exam-
ple, while age is negatively associated with
support for aid, it is positively associated with
the preference that aid be given for
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humanitarian ends, and not focused on bring-
ing benefits to Australia.
The rest of this paper is structured in the
following way. First, I cover existing interna-
tional work on public opinion about aid.
Although this work is often limited by the
questions it draws upon, it still points to a use-
ful set of variables for inclusion in regression
analysis. Following this review, I detail my
methods. I then move onto findings, first
looking at aggregate level responses before
moving to regression analysis. In the conclu-
sion, I discuss the ramifications of what I have
found for those who seek to change high-level
aid policy in Australia. (Replication files can
be downloaded from https://goo.gl/ufGzC2.)
2. Existing Research on Public Opinion
and Aid
An emerging international literature has identi-
fied a range of traits associated with people’s
opinions about aid. In this section, I cover the
main findings of existing work. This is done
to identify variables that might be expected to
be associated with variation in views about
aid in Australia and which—as a result—ought
to be tested for in my own regression analysis.
Following standard convention in the litera-
ture, I have grouped these variables together
in three types: socio-demographic traits, infor-
mation and knowledge, and beliefs.
2.1. Sociodemographic Traits
The diminishingmarginal utility of income pro-
vides cause to anticipate that wealthier people
will be more supportive of aid (Milner & Ting-
ley2010). In linewith this,most existing studies
have found income (or a related measure) to be
correlatedwithsupport for aid,with themoreaf-
fluent being more supportive (Chong &
Gradstein 2008; Diven & Constantelos 2009;
Paxton & Knack 2012). A number of studies
have found a similar positive relationship be-
tween education and support for aid (Cheng &
Smyth 2016; Chong & Gradstein 2008; Diven
& Constantelos 2009; Stern 1998). Existing re-
search has also found some evidence that aid is
more popular among younger people (Chong
and Gradstein 2008; Paxton and Knack 2012).
Thismay reflect generational changes or simply
a lower sense of economic vulnerability associ-
ated with youth. Paxton andKnack (2012) con-
tend psychological research showingwomen to
be more likely to hold other-regarding prefer-
ences, which provides cause to anticipate that
women will be more supportive of aid. Their
empirical findings confirm this. However, both
Chong and Gradstein (2008) and Henson and
Lindstrom (2013) found gender did not affect
views about aid.
The generalised concern with the welfare of
others associated with some religious beliefs
provides some reason to anticipate that reli-
gious people will be more supportive of aid
(Paxton and Knack 2012). However, Henson
and Lindstrom (2013) found no association
between religion and opposition to cutting aid
in the United Kingdom. Paxton and Knack
(2012) also found no relationship between
religiosity and support for aid, although they
did find a positive relationship between
frequent attendance of religious service and
support for aid.
2.2. Information and Knowledge
Compared with socio-demographic traits,
fewer studies have included variables associ-
ated with information sources and knowledge
of current affairs. However, Paxton and Knack
(2012) found that time spent watching televi-
sion (a proxy for news consumption and
awareness of international events) was posi-
tively associated with support for aid. Simi-
larly, the findings of Diven and Constantelos
(2009) suggest that people who are more
knowledgeable about international affairs are
more supportive of aid. And Paxton and Knack
found some evidence to suggest being born
overseas (once again a proxy for interest in in-
ternational affairs) increased support for aid
(Paxton & Knack 2012).
2.3. Beliefs
Most studies on opinions about aid that have
included ideology as an independent variable
have found a relationship between left-leaning
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political views and greater support for aid
(Cheng & Smyth 2016; Chong & Gradstein
2008; Milner & Tingley 2010; Milner &
Tingley 2013; Paxton & Knack 2012). This re-
lationship is thought to be a product of general
preferences for redistribution on the left, al-
though, interestingly, Henson and Lindstrom
(2013) found that concern with domestic pov-
erty was associated with a desire to see aid re-
duced in the United Kingdom. Other beliefs
that have been shown to be positively associ-
ated with support for aid include positive atti-
tudes to immigrants and foreigners (Clarke
et al. 2014; Minato 2015; Prather 2011), as
well as cosmopolitan views and support for
multilateralism (Paxton and Knack 2012;
Diven and Constantelos 2009).
3. Data and Methods
The data used in this paper come from two
different public opinion surveys. The first is
the ANU Poll, which was conducted by the
Social Research Centre in May 2014 on be-
half of the Australian National University.
The poll was a phone poll conducted by
using random digit dialling of both landlines
and mobile phones. The in-sample popula-
tion for the survey was Australian residents
aged 18 and over (McAllister 2014). The
sample size was 1,204, although because
some responses were missing for some
variables, the sample I worked with was
smaller.2
TheMay 2014 ANU Poll focused on foreign
policy and included two questions on attitudes
to aid. One of these questions was a very gen-
eral question about support for aid. Its wording
was drawn directly from a question used in sur-
veys in other countries:
Do you generally approve or disapprove of the
Australian Government providing aid to poorer
countries around the world? (Possible responses
were ordinal, from strongly disapprove to
strongly approve.)
The second question was about the purpose re-
spondents wanted Australian aid given for:
Do you think Australian government aid should
be given primarily on humanitarian grounds, or
do you think Australia’s commercial and political
interests should play a significant part? (Here
possible responses were: strongly favour
humanitarian; favour humanitarian; favour
commercial and political; and strongly favour
commercial and political.)
The second dataset came from an omnibus sur-
vey conducted by Essential Media. The survey
was conducted with a randomly selected sam-
ple drawn from an online panel of over
100,000 people, and the final sample size was
1,045. The survey was conducted in March
2015. The question involved differed from
the first ANU Poll question in that, rather than
asking generally about support for aid, it asked
about a specific set of cuts to the aid budget.
(Those which occurred in 2015.) It also pro-
vided information on the size of the aid budget
and was designed explicitly to get respondents
thinking about policy trade-offs. The question
asked was as follows:
Every year about 1.2% of Australian federal
government spending is spent on foreign aid to
poor countries. Recently the government
announced that it plans to cut foreign aid by nearly
20% starting in July. They have justified this as a
means of preventing government debt rising.
Which of the following options would you prefer
(each involves equivalent amounts of money)?
1. That aid not be cut and government debt
levels increase by a small additional
amount next year (approximately 0.4%) as
a result of this.
2. That aid not be cut and taxes be raised by a
small amount (approximately 0.3%) to pro-
duce the same reduction in government
debt sought from the aid cut.
3. That aid not be cut and other government
expenditure be cut by a small amount (ap-
proximately 0.2%) to produce the same re-
duction in government debt sought from
the aid cut.
4. That aid be cut by 20% as the government
is currently planning.
2. In robustness tests reported on in theAppendix S1 report
on regressions run on datasets where multiple imputation
was used to address the issue of missing responses.
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Both datasets were weighted to be representa-
tive of the Australian voting age population.
Both datasets also included a suite of socio-
demographic and belief-based questions which
provided me a set of independent variables that
I used in the regression analysis described be-
low. Variables were chosen on the basis of
the literature described above. The ANU Poll
provided more variables than were available
in the Essential Media Dataset. However, a
key group of variables were common to both
datasets. Table S1 provides descriptive statis-
tics for these variables.
My analysis below starts with simple com-
parisons of the aggregate responses to the ques-
tions listed above. However, in addition to
comparing overall results, I used different
forms of multiple regression to examine the
traits associated with different responses to
the three questions. Because the ANU Poll
question about approval of Australia giving
foreign aid solicited ordinal responses, I used
ordered logistic regressions.3 In the instance
of the ANU Poll question about aid purpose,
because the response categories were in part
categorical (humanitarian versus Australia’s
interest) and in part ordinal (strongly favour
vs favour for each category), I transformed
the variable into two categories (humanitarian
and Australia’s interest) and disregarded the fa-
vour versus strongly favour distinction. Having
done this, I analysed this question by using a
logistic regression.
For the Essential Media Poll question on aid
cuts versus alternatives, while multinomial re-
gression using the different categories would
have been possible, in the interests of more eas-
ily interpretable results, and because the issue
of most interest for this study was simply
whether Australians favoured aid cuts or not,
I opted to convert the response data into a bi-
nary variable distinguishing favouring aid cuts
from favouring any of the policy alternatives,
and subsequently made use of logistic regres-
sions to analyse the data. All the regression
models were run with survey weighting ap-
plied. Alternative models, run as robustness
tests, are reported on in the Appendix S1. Note
for now, however, that except when discussed
none of the main relationships identified below
changed significantly in these robustness tests.
4. Results
In this section, I report first on aggregate level
responses to all three questions and the differ-
ences between them. Then, I report on regres-
sion analysis of responses to the ANU Poll
question on support for aid. Following this, I
report on regression analysis of the responses
to the Essential Media question on aid cuts. Fi-
nally, I report on the ANU Poll question about
the purpose of aid. When reporting regression
results, I discuss independent variables in three
different groups: those associated with socio-
demographic traits, those associated with infor-
mation and knowledge, and those associated
with beliefs.
4.1. Aggregate Opinions
Figure 1 shows the weighted responses to the
ANU Poll question on support for the Austra-
lian Government giving aid. Figure 1 also
shows the weighted responses to the Essential
Media question about the 2015 aid cuts. In ad-
dition, Figure 1 shows the weighted responses
to the ANU Poll question about the purpose
of Australian aid. The charts in the figure show
that a clear majority of Australians approve of
their country giving aid. However, the figure
also shows that when Australians were pre-
sented with a more specific set of details, and
trade-offs between an aid cut and other policy
alternatives, a majority favoured aid cuts. The
final chart in the figure shows that a substantial
majority of Australians want their country’s aid
given for humanitarian ends, rather than to
benefit Australia.
It is possible, given the ANU Poll and Es-
sential Media surveys were separate surveys,
that the differences between responses to the
3. Logistic regressions were used rather than probit
models because they can produce results in the form of
(somewhat more easily interpretable) odds ratios. In terms
of predicted probabilities, the substantive findings that
emerge from logistic regressions are nearly identical to
those that emerge from probit models (Long & Freese
2014). Using probit models does not change the findings
that follow in any substantive way.
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general question about approval of Australia
giving aid and the more specific question about
aid cuts are simply a product of different sam-
ples; however, the magnitude of the differences
makes this very unlikely. In the ANU Poll
question, 74 per cent of respondents either ap-
prove or strongly approve of Australia giving
aid, while in the Essential Media question, only
Figure 1 Overall Responses to Questions About Aid
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43 per cent of the population opposed aid cuts.4
Although most Australians approve of
Australia giving aid in a broad sense, for a siz-
able subset, this approval did not mean that
they were averse to seeing the aid budget re-
duced. On the other hand, in aggregate, there
appears less difference between support for
aid and a preference for giving aid for human-
itarian reasons rather than giving it to bring
benefits to Australia.5
4.2. Predictors of Support for Aid
Moving from aggregate results, Table 1 shows
the results of a series of ordered logistic regres-
sion models in which the dependent variable
comes from the basic ANU Poll question on
approval of Australia giving foreign aid. In all
regressions, people who responded ‘don’t
know’ were treated as missing. The coeffi-
cients provided are odds ratios; beneath them,
p-values are provided in parentheses.6 Model
1 includes only socio-demographic variables.
Model 2 adds information-related variables,
and Model 3 includes additional variables to
do with beliefs. Model 4 is chosen to emulate,
in terms of the independent variables used,
the subsequent regressions run on data from
the Essential Media question about aid cuts
and policy trade-offs.
Almost all of the socio-demographic traits
included in the regression models are statisti-
cally significant and are statistically significant
in all of the models. Being older and being
male are associated with a lower probability
of supporting aid, while having an academic
education and living in an urban area are
associated with an increased probability of
supporting aid, although the urban variable
ceases to be statistically significant in the third
model.
The relationship between income and sup-
port for aid is not statistically significant except
in the final model. However, the p-values for
this variable are close to 0.05 in three of the
other models.7 The relationship between religi-
osity and support for aid is complex: Religious
people who rarely attend religious service are
less supportive of aid than non-religious peo-
ple; however, frequent attenders of religious
service are actually more likely to approve of
Australia giving aid.
The information-related variables are not as-
sociated with support for aid. However, beliefs
are important. The two beliefs that, broadly
put, reflect a cosmopolitan or internationalist
worldview (favourable views of China and
Indonesia, and support for multilateral organi-
sations) are both positively associated with
support for aid. Concern with domestic poverty
is also positively associated with support for
aid. Politically, supporters of the left leaning
Green Party and centre-left Labour party are
much more supportive of aid than centre-right
Coalition supporters.
The statistically significant predictors in
Model 3 all have substantively meaningful
effects. In Figure 2, I use predicted marginal ef-
fects to illustrate the magnitude of the effect for
the largest categorical predictors from Model
3. These are Greens and Labour supporters,
people who are worried about domestic pov-
erty and people who attend religious service
at least once a week. For each predictor, the
chart shows the change in probability of
strongly approving of Australia giving aid
vis-à-vis the omitted category. (The omitted
categories are respectively Coalition sup-
porters, people who are not worried about do-
mestic poverty and the non-religious.) The
probabilities in the chart are calculated by
using average marginal effects and, to give
one example, can be read as showing that, av-
eraged across the population and controlling
for other factors, being a Green voter instead
4. Reflecting the magnitude of the difference, the p-value
for the difference in a two sample proportion test is <0.01
5. Although differences in question wording make direct
comparisons difficult, using more recent data, Wood and
Burkot (2017, p. 5) find a public slightly less in favour of
aid cuts. Preliminary study of the same data reveals very
similar correlates of views on aid volume to those found
here.
6. p-values are provided rather than standard errors be-
cause the usual rule of thumb that allows for inferring p-
values from coefficients and standard errors is not applica-
ble when reporting odds ratios.
7. Moreover, the relationship became statistically signifi-
cant in three of the four alternate models run as robustness
tests and reported on in the Appendix S1.
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Table 1 Ordered Logistic Regression Results, Support for Australia Giving Aid
Support Australian Government aid Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Age 0.99* (0.01) 0.99** (0.01) 0.99* (0.04) 0.99** (0.01)
Academic tertiary education 2.74*** (0.00) 2.70*** (0.00) 1.89** (0.00) 2.70*** (0.00)
Income (natural log) 1.20 (0.06) 1.16 (0.15) 1.25 (0.07) 1.27* (0.02)
Urban 1.53** (0.01) 1.50*(0.02) 1.25 (0.23) 1.42* (0.03)
Male 0.72* (0.02) 0.72* (0.03) 0.62** (0.00) 0.71* (0.02)
Religious never attends (vs non-religious) 0.52** (0.00) 0.52** (0.00) 0.54** (0.01)
Religious attends <1/yr 0.46** (0.00) 0.42*** (0.00) 0.51* (0.01)
Religious attends at least once/year 0.69 (0.16) 0.67 (0.15) 0.66 (0.22)
Religious attends several times/year 0.74 (0.21) 0.78 (0.31) 0.93 (0.81)
Religious attends at least once/month 0.43* (0.03) 0.49 (0.07) 0.56 (0.14)
Religious attends at least once/week 1.70* (0.03) 1.82* (0.03) 2.51** (0.00)
Born in a developing country 0.76 (0.32) 0.98 (0.94)
News intake 1.11 (0.51) 1.07 (0.71)
Worried about immigration 0.70 (0.09)
Worried about budget 0.62 (0.06)
Worried about domestic poverty 2.30** (0.00)
Favourable views of China/Indonesia 1.89***(0.00)
Favourable views of multilaterals 1.60***(0.00)
Party Labour (vs Coalition) 2.28*** (0.00) 2.46*** (0.00)
Party Greens (vs Coalition) 2.84** (0.00) 3.17*** (0.00)
Party other (vs Coalition) 0.90 (0.71) 0.93 (0.79)
Party do not know (vs Coalition) 1.53 (0.20) 1.34 (0.32)
Cut 1 0.11*** (0.00) 0.12*** (0.00) 0.11** (0.00) 0.23*** (0.00)
Cut 2 0.33**(0.01) 0.36 (0.07) 0.40 (0.21) 0.71 (0.44)
Cut 3 2.52* (0.03) 2.63 (0.10) 4.62* (0.04) 5.54*** (0.00)
N 842 802 762 841




Figure 2 Increase in Probability of Strongly Approving of Australia Giving Aid
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of a Coalition voter increases one’s probability
of strongly approving of Australia giving aid
by 0.19.
Three continuous variables in Model 3 of
Table 1 are also statistically significant: age,
attitudes to multilateral organisations and
favourable views about China and Indonesia.
Simply glancing at the coefficients for the var-
iables about China and Indonesia, and views
about multilaterals, suggests that the effects of
these variables are non-trivial. And, indeed, av-
eraged across the population and controlling
for other variables, a one standard deviation
change in support for multilaterals is associated
with a 0.08 increase in an Australian’s proba-
bility of strongly approving of aid. The same
change in views about China and Indonesia is
associated with a 0.11 increase. The size of
the coefficient of age, on the other hand, seems
to indicate a trivial effect. However, the coeffi-
cient is for an additional year of age, and age’s
impact becomes much more notable over lon-
ger periods. On average, with other effects con-
trolled for, the probability of a 60-year-old
strongly approving of aid is 0.07 lower than
that of a 20-year-old.
4.3. Aid Cuts Versus Alternatives
Having looked at overall support for aid, in this
section, I draw on the question asked about the
2015–2016 cuts to the Australian government
aid budget. As already discussed and shown in
Figure 1, opposition to the 2015–2016 aid cuts
was much lower than general support for aid.
Table 2 shows the results of two logistic regres-
sion models run in which the dependent vari-
able was a binary variable coded zero if the
respondent preferred that aid be cut and coded
one if the respondent preferred a policy alterna-
tive. The coefficients shown are odds ratios. p-
values are shown in parentheses. The data
provided by Essential Media included fewer
potential covariates than was the case with the
ANU Poll data. However, a number of impor-
tant socio-demographic covariates are included
inModel 1 and the belief-based variable of pre-
ferred political party is included in Model 2.
For the socio-demographic traits, the results
of these regressions are similar but not identical
to those from the ANU Poll data on general
support for aid (those shown in Model 4 in
Table 1). Because the data come from two sep-
arate surveys, it is not possible to formally test
the differences between coefficients. However,
an informal comparison suggests that results
for age, academic education, urban dwelling
and political views are similar. A similar com-
parison suggests that the relationship between
gender and views about cuts differs from the
relationship between gender and general ap-
proval of aid giving. It appears that the effect
of income differs too.
Figure 3 gives a sense of the substantive
magnitude of the effect of party support on op-
position to aid cuts. Aswith Figure 2, the figure
is based on calculations using average mar-
ginal effects, and it can be interpreted the same
way, with the omitted base category being Co-
alition supporters. As can be seen, as with
Figure 2, the impact of party allegiance is sub-
stantial. In the case of Green party supporters,
it is particularly high.
4.4. The Purpose of Aid
Table 3 shows that the results of three logistic
regression models run with a dependent
Table 2 Logistic RegressionResults, Alternative Policy
Versus Aid Cuts
Model 1 Model 2
Age 0.98*** (0.00) 0.98*** (0.00)
Academic
tertiary education
1.74*** (0.00) 1.64** (0.00)
Income (natural log) 0.92 (0.51) 0.91 (0.46)
Urban 1.50* (0.02) 1.52* (0.02)










Party do not know
(vs Coalition)
1.23 (0.41)
Constant 1.92 (0.26) 1.20 (0.77)
N 885 847
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variable that was binary and coded one if the
respondent favoured or strongly favoured the
purpose of Australian aid to be humanitarian,
or zero if the respondent favoured or strongly
favoured the purpose of Australian aid being
to benefit Australia commercially or politi-
cally. The first model is limited to socio-
demographic variables, the second includes
information-related variables, and the third in-
cludes beliefs. The coefficients shown are odds
ratios and p-values are shown in parentheses.
Scanning the results table quickly reveals
that there are almost no socio-demographic
variables that are related to views about the
ends aid should be given for. Of these vari-
ables, the apparent relationship in Model 1 be-
tween monthly religious service and a
preference for aid given to advance Australia’s
interests is very hard to find an explanation for,
given the attendance categories above and be-
low have odds ratios greater than one. Because
of this, it seems likely the observed relationship
is a product of chance alone. The relationship
between being male and a preference for aid
given in Australia’s interest appears more plau-
sible, although the relationship ceases to be sta-
tistically significant in the third model. The
relationship between age and support for hu-
manitarian aid that emerges in Model 3
indicates that older Australians are more sup-
portive of humanitarian aid. This is a surprising
contrast with the results from the two earlier re-
gressions on support for aid and views about
aid cuts, in which older people were less sup-
portive of aid and less likely to oppose aid cuts.
Moving beyond demographic and socioeco-
nomic traits, other findings emerge. The first of
these is that people who consume more news
are more likely to prefer that Australian aid
be given for humanitarian purposes. Of the
belief-related variables, favourable opinions
about multilateral institutions are clearly asso-
ciated with support for aid given for humanitar-
ian ends, as is concern about domestic poverty.
Labour supporters and Green supporters are
more likely than Coalition supporters (the
omitted category) to prefer that aid be given
on humanitarian grounds.8 As with earlier re-
gressions, in Figure 4, I illustrate the magni-
tude of the statistically significant categorical
predictors. The x-axis plots the average change
in probability of favouring humanitarian aid
compared with the omitted category with other
variables controlled for.
8. The Labour relationship ceases to be statistically signif-
icant in one of the alternate models run as robustness tests.
Figure 3 Party and Increase in Probability of Support for Policy Alternatives to Aid Cuts
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Table 3 Logistic Regression Results, Preferences for Aid Purpose
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age 1.01 (0.09) 1.01 (0.17) 1.02* (0.05)
Academic education 1.12 (0.65) 1.14 (0.60) 0.73 (0.26)
Income (natural log) 1.03 (0.85) 0.93 (0.64) 1.04 (0.82)
Urban 0.74 (0.25) 0.81 (0.43) 0.70 (0.20)
Male 0.54** (0.01) 0.58* (0.03) 0.64 (0.10)
Religious but never attends (vs non-religious) 0.87 (0.67) 1.04 (0.91) 1.05 (0.89)
Religious and attends <1/yr 0.94 (0.91) 1.01 (0.99) 1.62 (0.46)
Religious and attends at least once a year 1.18 (0.72) 0.92 (0.87) 0.79 (0.63)
Religious and attends several times per year 1.21 (0.62) 1.18 (0.70) 1.32 (0.54)
Religious and attends at least once a month 0.43* (0.04) 0.43 (0.06) 0.55 (0.26)
Religious and attends at least once a week 1.18 (0.67) 1.16 (0.74) 1.72 (0.27)
Born in a developing country 0.52 (0.09) 0.52 (0.13)
News intake 1.88* (0.01) 2.13** (0.01)
Worried about immigration 0.65 (0.16)
Worried about budget 0.78 (0.53)
Worried about domestic poverty-related issues 6.90** (0.01)
Favourable views of China/Indonesia 1.12 (0.44)
Favourable views of multilaterals 1.47** (0.00)
Party Labour (vs Coalition) 1.98* (0.03)
Party Greens (vs Coalition) 4.40** (0.01)
Party other (vs Coalition) 1.18 (0.69)
Party do not know (vs Coalition) 4.73* (0.02)
Constant 5.15* (0.01) 1.71 (0.54) 0.47 (0.46)
N 793 754 720




Figure 4 The Impact of Concern With Domestic Poverty and Parties on Aid Purpose
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Because the question about aid purpose was
asked in the same survey as the question about
approval of aid giving, it is possible to formally
test for differences in the coefficients of the in-
dependent variables across the full models run
for both questions. Such tests show that the re-
lationship between a number of traits and the
responses to the two questions are clearly dif-
ferent. Full results of these tests are provided
in a table in the online Appendix S1; however,
for now, of particular interest is the fact that, as
noted above, the relationship between age and
the belief that aid should be given for humani-
tarian ends is positive, whereas the relationship
between age and support for aid is negative.
Also, academic education is positively associ-
ated with support for age but there is no evi-
dence of any relationship between academic
education and views about aid purpose. (In for-
mal testing in the Appendix S1, the difference
in coefficients for both of these variables is
found to be statistically significant.) The subset
of the Australian population most likely to ap-
prove of Australia giving aid is not identical to
that most likely to want Australia to give aid
for the sake of helping other countries.
5. Discussion
Most Australians approve of their government
giving aid; however, responses to a more de-
tailed policy-related question show that, when
confronted with trade-offs, despite their broad
approval of aid, in 2015, the majority of Aus-
tralians were happy to see the aid budget cut.
When faced with a choice between aid cuts
and domestic alternatives to aid cuts, most
Australians indicated that they preferred the
course of action in which aid was cut and costs
were borne overseas. At the same time, how-
ever, few Australians want a domestic divi-
dend from the aid that their country does
give: Most were happy to see this money given
for humanitarian ends, rather than for the sake
of bringing benefits to Australia. Taken to-
gether, these findings have important ramifica-
tions for those who would like to see recent
changes to Australian aid reversed.
The first of these is that promoting aid by
emphasising the benefits that it can bring to
Australia is not likely to be an effective strat-
egy for shifting the views the typical Austra-
lian holds about the size of the aid budget.
Recent research has shown that it is possible
to change people’s views on aid. However,
doing so is not straightforward, and not all
arguments succeed (Wood 2016). At present,
the benefits that aid can bring to Australia are
being repeatedly emphasised by supporters of
aid within the Coalition government. Senior
supporters of aid within the Coalition govern-
ment have explicitly stated that they believe
that doing this is needed to win support for
an increased aid budget in the future (Bishop
2017; Fierravanti-Wells 2017). My findings
do not do not provide any evidence that Aus-
tralians are particularly likely to be amenable
to arguments made along these lines.
The second ramification is that it will likely
be easier to enlist the public to the cause of
change in the area of aid purpose than it will
be to the cause of an increased an aid budget.
To date, however, public campaigning on aid-
related matters, which has been led by the
NGO coalition the Campaign for Australian
Aid, has focused almost exclusively on at-
tempts to reverse aid cuts (e.g. Campaign for
Australian Aid 2017). There are compelling ar-
guments for increasing the Australian aid bud-
get, and policy is rarely changed without
pressure. As a result, advocacy about aid vol-
ume has its place. However, given that the pub-
lic is more likely to be supportive of changes to
the purpose of Australian aid aimed at increas-
ing its development focus, aid’s advocates
would be wise to devote some of their public
campaigning resources to this area.
The differences in the findings between the
regressions on support for aid and views about
aid purpose suggest that—if it is undertaken—
campaigning on purposemay be better targeted
at a different subsection of the Australian popu-
lation than that targeted in campaigning on aid
volume. To date, much of the work of organisa-
tions like the Campaign for Australian Aid has
been focused on university campuses.My find-
ings suggest this is appropriate given the Cam-
paign’s focus on aid volume, and given its
desire to motivate an already supportive base.
However, were campaigners to shift their focus
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to the purpose of aid, my results indicate that
the most supportive base for this particular is-
sue may be found elsewhere. Of course, as
Figure 1 shows, support on the issue of aid pur-
pose is high across Australia, and university
students may bring other advantages, including
a higher propensity towards taking action.
However, at the very least, other demographics
ought to be easier tomotivate if campaign focus
is shifted to aid purpose. As a result, increased
interaction with other parts of Australian soci-
ety should be considered if the focus of
campaigning does shift to aid purpose.
The clear left–right divide that was found in
all three sets of regression results provides
campaigners with a clear steer as to where their
ideological base is most likely to be found.
Knowledge of a support base among people
on the centre–left may seem of limited utility
at a time when a centre–right coalition cur-
rently holds government. However, govern-
ments change, and those who wish to
promote high-level policy change would do
well to prepare to mobilise public support on
both aid quality and aid quantity issues from
the left when the government next changes.
Such a political break could provide the best
opportunity to reverse recent changes and en-
suring that there is a loud public push for
change from among the central support base
of the new government will be important.
Public opinion is not the only factor
influencing high-level Australian aid policy,
but international evidence suggests it can play
a role. There is also a clear belief both among
campaigners and Australian politicians that
the views of the public matter. This paper has
shown what these views are, while at the same
time showing that the Australian public is far
from homogenous in its views. Different types
of Australians have different views on policy-
related questions about aid, and individual
Australians do not always hold the same views
about all aspects of aid policy.
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